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The Pathology of Patriarchy and Family Inequalities 
 
Everyone in the world belongs to at least two families: the one in to which we were born and the 
ones we create in adulthood. Underlying this shared global experience is a wealth of individual 
diversity in how family shapes us emotionally, physically, and economically throughout our lives 
and, in turn, the lives of our children.  The first goal of this chapter is to present a holistic 
conceptual frame for comparing the group inequalities in inputs, family processes, and outcomes 
discussed in the other chapters of this volume.  Crucially, the frame highlights that relative group 
differences over time and across countries are configured at the intersections of family, market, 
and state institutions.  
Much research in this area, including some of the chapters in this volume, implicitly or 
explicitly view recent family changes as examples of the “pathology of matriarchy” first raised in 
Moynihan’s 1965 report on The Negro Family: The Case for National Action.  The basis of this 
perspective is the strong and persistent correlation between female-headed families and negative 
outcomes for children (McLanahan, Tach, and Schneider 2013). The point to stress, though, is 
that these ill effects are particularly acute in the United States with its unique ideological 
acceptance of large class, gender, racial, and other group inequalities. As revealed in this and 
other chapters in the book, the magnitude of the family changes and especially their negative 
outcomes varies across cultural, economic, and political contexts.   
The second goal of this chapter is to argue that the pattern of this cross-context variation 
does not point to an inherent pathology of matriarchy.  Indeed, the differences in life chances 
across family types are minimized where institutional arrangements, unlike in the United States, 
support greater gender along with class equality (Nieuwenhuis and Maldonado, forthcoming).  
Furthermore, gendered responses to the inter-related institutional changes over the past half 
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century suggest instead it is the pathology of patriarchy disproportionately hurting the life 
chances of boys and men. I draw broadly on Connell (1987; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005) to 
define patriarchy as men’s historically institutionalized dominance over women in the family, 
labor market, and state.
1
  As the institutional support for patriarchy gives way, a sizeable 
minority of men struggle to adapt in healthy ways, undermining family formation and stability.   
Next I outline the conceptual frame for situating family processes and outcomes in their 
institutional contexts.  Then I use the existing literature and other chapters in this book to 
highlight how structural changes over the past half-century make patriarchal assumptions 
untenable for a growing proportion of men.  In conclusion, I argue that only fully 
institutionalizing gender equality will minimize negative outcomes associated with family 
change. In part, fully-institutionalized gender equality ensures children have access to more 
economic and emotional resources regardless of family form. More importantly, fully-
institutionalized gender equality encourages development of new normative masculinities that 
support greater family stability in evolving institutional contexts.  
Dynamic institutional intersections 
Figure 1 diagrams the “nested intersections” of institutions, family processes, and child and adult 
outcomes. The first box in the diagram indicates the socio-economic structures that affect family 
formation and dissolution noted in the second box, which create the group differences in 
inequalities in individual outcomes outlined in the lower box.  The structural effects occur at the 
                                                          
1
 Connell’s concept of hegemonic masculinities from which I derive this definition of patriarchy not only 
incorporates the institutionalized patriarchal power relations between men and women, but also the 
sexual, class, and racial-ethnic hierarchies among men vis-à-vis a hegemonic ideal (Connell and 
Messerschmidt 2005). Fully explicating this theoretically vis-à-vis further group differences in family 
inequalities is beyond the scope of this chapter.   
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intersections of family, market, and state institutions in a dynamic interplay that varies across 
and within national contexts over time.   
Intersectionality is not commonly used to refer to institutional effects.  Conventionally, 
intersectionality is a feminist paradigm emphasizing that no single master social category such as 
gender or class grasps the different experiences and social locations of all group members 
(McCall 2005). Consequently, intersectionality demands that we consider identities and 
experiences at the intersection of an individual’s group memberships (Collins 1991; McCall 
2005).  Hence, Figure 1 includes a shaded circle spanning institutions, family processes, and 
outcomes to indicate that effects vary at the intersection of an individual’s gender, class, race-
ethnicity, immigrant status, sexual orientation, and the like.  Due to space constraints, discussion 
in this chapter is primarily limited to gender and class differences, with education used as the 
main proxy for class.  
Similarly, no master institution accounts for institutional effects on people’s lives. 
Instead, individual and group differences are nested in the intersections of family, market, and 
state institutions, and supra-national institutions such as the European Union and World Bank.  
This may seem like common sense, but bears emphasizing when comparing possible causes and 
consequences of family inequalities across Europe and the Americas as done in this book. For 
example, the institution of family includes norms about what or who constitutes a family, along 
with the expected behavior of family members.  During early industrialization, the patriarchal 
heterosexual, nuclear, male breadwinner/female carer model of family became hegemonic in 
many, but not all Western economies.  
Men’s economic dominance under this model was theoretically enshrined in U.S. 
economist Gary Becker’s (1981) specialization theory of family. Becker argued that families in 
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industrial societies optimize household production and reproduction when one partner specializes 
in paid work and the other in unpaid family work such as housework and childcare.  The math 
behind the theory is gender-neutral in that either partner could specialize in paid or unpaid work 
depending on their individual aptitudes and preferences. But, reflecting the patriarchal world in 
which he was raised, Becker (1981) ultimately concluded women’s childbearing gives them a 
comparative advantage in family work, whereas the gender wage gap indicates men’s 
comparative advantage in employment. Governments in most, but not all, countries reinforced 
the patriarchal order in the post-World War II expansion of employment-based welfare 
provisions payable to the primary breadwinner (Cooke 2011).  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Perpetuation of the male breadwinner model of family, though, requires a labor market 
that enables all members of a family to survive on a single income.  This became possible for the 
newly-created European and North American middle classes beginning in the 19
th
 Century 
(Cooke 2011). The possibility extended to the working classes as well in the brief post-war 
period when workers enjoyed the fruits of their growing productivity (Cherlin 2014; Gottschalk 
and Smeeding 1997). Since then, the evolution from industrial to post-industrial labor markets 
made the patriarchal male breadwinner model of family increasingly unsustainable.  
De-industrialization and de-unionization made less-skilled men the first to lose their 
ability to support a family. High-wage manufacturing jobs disappeared, replaced by growing 
employment in low-wage service sector jobs (Carlson, this volume; Cherlin 2014). Neoliberal 
policies exacerbated less-skilled workers’ labor market losses. For instance, in a bid to enhance 
employer flexibility in competitive global markets, some governments eased employment 
protections and allowed the real value of minimum wages to fall (Immervoll 2007).  Wage 
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inequalities widened further as returns to a university degree sharply increased beginning in the 
1980s in the United States and Great Britain, and in the 1990s in other Western countries 
(Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997; Machin 2010).  
Nonetheless, the middle classes are not safe either.  Since the late 1980s, technological 
expansion has led to falling employment shares among middle-waged occupations in North 
America (Autor 2010) and Europe (Goos, Manning, and Salomons 2009). But the specific 
pattern of polarization varies across Western labor markets, as indicated in Table 1.  The loss of 
middle-waged occupations in Austria, France, and Italy was off-set by strong growth in the 
highest-waged occupations.  In contrast, the middle-wage job loss in Finland and Norway was 
off-set by growth in only low-wage occupations.  In the UK as in the United States (Autor 2010), 
shrinking middle-wage employment was off-set by approximately equal growth in both low- and 
high-wage jobs.    
Consequently, to varying degrees, post-industrial labor markets no longer support the 
patriarchal male breadwinner model as did the post-war labor markets. In almost every OECD 
country, the employment rate of prime-age (25 to 54) men decreased since the 1970s (OECD 
2016; see also Eberstadt, this volume).  The trajectories of younger adults making critical 
decisions about education, employment, and family are more precarious than at any other time 
during the past half century (Eurofound 2016).  The evolving labor markets, coupled with 
cultural and policy shifts, eroded men’s comparative advantage in employment.  Simultaneously, 
gendered divisions of paid work narrowed.     
Evolving family divisions of labor 
Any gender and other group hierarchies embedded in the institution of family are constantly 
contested (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Ferree 2010).  In 1963, Friedan’s book on The 
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Feminine Mystique struck a chord with Western housewives who felt trapped, alienated, and 
vulnerable inside their homes and economically dependent on husbands. Friedan (1963) called 
for a revolution, for women to seize education and return to paid work. Friedan’s timing was 
perfect, coinciding with the introduction of the birth control pill, coupled with the easing of anti-
contraception laws in many Western nations (Cooke 2011).  
Women particularly embraced higher education. By the 1990s, women’s educational 
attainment in most Western countries had caught up with men’s. By 2011, college attainment 
among women aged 25 – 34 exceeded that of men in 28 of 34 OECD countries (OECD 2013). A 
consistent pattern across countries is that educated women are more likely to be employed than 
less-educated women (Cooke 2011; Harkness 2013; Pettit and Hook 2009).  Nevertheless, 
growth of the service sector expanded job opportunities for less-skilled women, who take these 
jobs more often than similarly-skilled men (OECD 2016). Consequently, and in contrast to men, 
women’s labor force participation rates steadily increased from the 1970s, as shown in Table 2.   
The intersection of the state with family and market institutions is evident in the regional 
variation in these trends. As noted earlier, most post-war welfare state policies reinforced a male 
breadwinner model. The exception to this was the Nordic model offering extensive policy 
supports for maternal employment such as public provision of childcare and paid parental leave 
(Cooke and Baxter 2010). Consequently, Finnish and Swedish women’s labor force participation 
rates already exceeded 70% in 1975.  The link between women’s education and employment is 
also weaker in these more egalitarian countries (Harkness 2013; Pettit and Hook 2009). At the 
other end of the policy spectrum, the very low 1975 labor force participation rates of Dutch, 
Italian, and Spanish women reflected the national policy reinforcement of the male breadwinner 
model at that time.  
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The power of policy to change behavior across diverse cultural and historical contexts is 
evident in the wake of the European Union’s 2000 Lisbon Treaty.  The Lisbon Treaty contained 
an explicit goal of 60% female labor force participation in all member states by 2010, supported 
by expansion of public childcare and other family policies found in the Nordic model.
2
  The 
over-time trends presented in Table 2 indicate the Lisbon strategy had some success. By 2015, 
the labor force participation rate of women in almost all European countries exceeded that in the 
United States.  Yet one downside of the employment growth in the service economy is the 
increase in part-time rather than full-time jobs.  In all countries, women are more likely than men 
to work part-time.  Still, the percentage of women’s total employment that is part-time varies 
from a low of 7.4% in the Czech Republic to a high of more than 60% among Dutch women 
(Table 2).   
[Table 2 about here] 
Persistent gender differences in hours employed contributes to the persistent gender wage 
gap in median earnings, indicated in the final column of Table 2.  Even in the Nordic countries, 
the gender wage gap varies from a low of 6% in Norway, to a high of 20% in Finland. Finland’s 
gender wage gap is in fact larger than the gender wage gap in the less regulated British and U.S. 
economies.   Nevertheless, women’s gains in employment and relative earnings over the past half 
century are extraordinary, although gender employment equality remains elusive under even the 
most supportive policy framework to date.   
One likely reason women made greater employment gains over the past few decades as 
compared with men is because of their greater predilection for education.  Women might also 







navigate changing labor markets more successfully than men because of the growing employer 
demand for social in conjunction with cognitive skills (Deming 2015).  The gender response to 
U.S. job polarization provides an example of women’s better adaptation.  The decrease in 
middle-wage employment between 1979 and 2007 was more than twice as large for U.S. women 
as men, 15.8% versus 7%, respectively (Autor 2010: 10). Nevertheless, female employment 
overwhelmingly moved up the occupational wage distribution as middle-wage employment fell 
(Autor 2010).  The decrease in U.S. men’s middle-wage employment led to a more even split in 
employment growth in men’s low- and high-wage occupations (Autor 2010).  This highlights 
that the most skilled men continue to make gains in the new economy, sustaining their advantage 
over high-skilled women.  But Autor (2010) found evidence of losses even among university-
educated men, more of whom became employed in middle- and low-wage occupations.  Future 
comparative work is needed to confirm whether these gender differences occurred in countries 
with varying patterns of polarization.      
In any event, changing gender divisions of paid labor require some adaptation in how 
unpaid family work gets done.  In this area as well, women have made greater behavioral 
changes than men.  Unfortunately, men’s failure to become full partners in unpaid family work 
encourages greater class inequality among women within and across labor markets.   
Gender-class redistribution of unpaid work  
Goldscheider and Sassler (this volume) laud the continuing gender revolution indicated by slow 
but somewhat steady increases in Western men’s unpaid childcare, most recently among less-
educated men who historically professed the most conservative gender attitudes.  Yet the 
decrease in women’s total domestic time during the revolution has been greater than the increase 
in men’s (Kan, Sullivan, and Gershuny 2011). Multinational time diary data from the early 1970s 
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through the early 2000s are available for the Netherlands, Norway, the UK, and United States.  
These data show that women in these countries on average reduced their 337 minutes per day of 
housework and childcare by 60 minutes between the two time periods (Kan, et al. 2011: 236).  
Men in these countries increased their 117 minutes per day domestic contribution by 40 minutes 
across the period (Kan, et al. 2011: 236). 
Not even the Nordic model has yet to eliminate gender inequality in unpaid work. 
Norwegian women in the early 2000s spent a similar amount of time as U.S. women doing daily 
domestic tasks (Kan, et al. 2011).  Divisions were slightly more equal in Sweden, but because 
Swedish women spent appreciably less time doing these tasks than Norwegian or U.S. women.  
The net result of these over-time shifts is that partnered women in all countries still perform 60% 
or more of household unpaid work (Kan, et al. 2011).  If future progress continues at the same 
rate as past progress—and this is a big “if” that Goldscheider and Sassler fully embrace—gender 
equality in unpaid work would not be achieved for another half century (Kan, et al. 2011). 
 The void created by men’s failure to contribute fully to family unpaid work is filled by 
the service sector, encouraging a growing class divide in women’s domestic equality gains. 
Gupta and his colleagues (2010) found that high-wage German, Swedish, and U.S. women spend 
significantly less time doing routine housework than their lower-waged peers.  The institutional 
context matters, as differences among women are greater where aggregate income inequality is 
greater as in the United States (Gupta, et al. 2010).  The demand for market substitutes for 
domestic work is undoubtedly one driver of the low-wage job growth in Great Britain and the 
United States.    
Class and also racial-ethnic divisions among women increasingly span continents, as the 
use of migrant domestic workers in affluent economies surged since the 1990s (Williams 2012; 
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Zimmerman, Litt, and Bose 2006).  This includes an increase in the Nordic countries after 
governments introduced cash transfers to reduce the high cost of providing public care services 
(Williams 2012). As a result, the number of migrant care workers increased in Denmark, 
Norway, and Sweden as well as other European and North American countries (Williams 2012; 
Zimmerman, et al. 2006).  
The growth in migrant care work highlights that family inequalities in paid and unpaid 
work span first and third world countries. If women in affluent economies struggle to balance 
employment and family, imagine the challenges for women doing so across national borders.  
Regardless of the care drain migrant work imposes on families in the sending countries, many 
governments actively encourage the migration of women over men (Williams 2012; 
Zimmerman, et al. 2006).  This is because migrant women on average send more of their 
earnings back to their families, which improves the national balance of payments required under 
international financial aid packages (Zimmerman, et al. 2006).  Migrant male workers, in 




Despite the downsides, all of the trends indicate that a growing number of women 
worldwide increasingly take advantage of post-industrial global labor markets. Of course, the 
highest-skilled men still benefit the most, but global markets increasingly tip the employment 
balance in favor of moderate- and less-skilled women over similar men.  Global markets also 
allow high-wage women to fill the care deficit created by men’s limited unpaid work by 
purchasing support from less-advantaged women.  At the same time, the proportion of younger 
                                                          
3
 This gender difference in family expenditures is not unique to the third world. Lundberg and colleagues’ 
(1997) analysis of British family cash transfers found that expenditures on children’s clothing increased 
when women received the transfers rather than men. 
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less-skilled women continues to shrink at a faster rate than men’s (OECD 2013). Policies also 
nudge women more than men.  These evolving institutional effects shaping gender equality at its 
intersection with class (and race-ethnicity) are brought to bear on family formation patterns.   
Institutional effects on class inequalities in family forms 
Becker (1981, 1985) believed that the mutual dependence created by gender specialization in 
paid or unpaid work enhances marital stability and fertility.  Certainly, the three-institutional 
reinforcement of Becker’s patriarchal model in the post-war decades reinforced a family 
formation sequence of marriage, childbearing, and children being raised by the two biological 
parents. This anomalous period in modern industrial history comprised the “golden age of 
marriage” in Western societies (Festy 1980). Couples married earlier, leading to a spike in 
fertility in many countries (Van Bavel and Reher 2013). Whether the sequence reflected choice 
or constraint is debatable. Few women had the independent economic resources to remain single 
or to leave an unhappy or abusive marriage. Conception outside of marriage was deeply 
stigmatizing for both the mother and the child, and most often resulted in either a “shot-gun” 
wedding or putting the child up for adoption.  
Yet institutional intersections are dynamic. They vary across countries at any given point 
in time, as well as over time within countries.  Esteve and Paredes (this volume) note that 
marriage was not historically pre-eminent in Central and Latin America.  Instead, cohabitation 
and union instability were structural dimensions of family life when marriage reached its zenith 
in the West (Esteve and Paredes, this volume).  During that time in the West, pronatalist policies 
combined with supports for maternal employment in Nordic and socialist countries correlated 
with higher nonmarital fertility rates (Cooke 2011; Perelli-Harris, this volume). Relatedly, 
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cohabitation in social-democratic Denmark and Sweden began to increase in the 1960s, a decade 
ahead of other countries in Europe (Hall and White 2005: 30).  
Over the past 50 years, more women throughout Europe and the Americas cohabit rather 
than marry and raise children outside of marriage whether because of divorce or nonmarital 
childbearing (Carlson, this volume; Esteve and Paredes, this volume; Perelli-Harris, this 
volume).  What intrigues or worries many social scientists and policy makers are the educational 
and/or racial-ethnic disparities in these family patterns that reflect and/or magnify inequalities 
among families.  For most whites in the United States and non-Nordic European countries, 
avant-garde family arrangements in the 1960s such as cohabitation or divorce were the purview 
of a small elite. As alternative family forms became more culturally acceptable and legally 
possible, Goode (1970) anticipated they would become more prevalent among the less- rather 
than highly-educated.  His prediction has largely been borne out, although educational gradients 
in marriage, cohabitation, nonmarital childbearing, and divorce vary in their institutional context 
(Carlson, this volume).  
Within a patriarchal structure, men’s economic capacity predicted by education still plays 
an important role in women’s family choices as Cherlin argues here and elsewhere (Cherlin 
2014). For example, Cherlin (this volume) attributes changes in the educational gradient in U.S. 
single motherhood to the disparate gender earnings effects of job polarization. His prima facie 
case seems convincing. Recall that moderately-educated women improved their earnings 
position in response to polarization while that of moderately-educated men deteriorated (Autor 
2010).  The percentage of U.S. children living with moderately-educated single mothers 
increased in each decade since the 1980s, whereas that for both the least- and most-educated 
women remained fairly stable since the 1990s (Cherlin, this volume).   
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But education predicts much more than economic outcomes—even in the United States—
that also have a bearing on family commitment and stability.  These associations should not be 
given short shrift in discussions of educational gradients in family formation because they offer 
much deeper insights as to the causes as well as consequences of observed family patterns. To 
date, Kalmijn (2013) is the only demographer to explore the interplays between the institutional 
context and the possible meanings of education behind the gradients.     
Beyond the economics of education 
Kalmijn (2013) noted that education predicts not only economic prospects, but more egalitarian 
attitudes as well.  He subsequently hypothesized that the degree of gender inequality in a society 
determines which aspect of education accounts for educational gradients in family formation 
(Kalmijn 2013). In the 26 European countries analyzed, Kalmijn found that highly-educated 
women in male breadwinner contexts were less likely to have ever married and, if they married, 
more likely to have divorced.  In contrast, less-educated women in these contexts have fewer 
non-marital economic alternatives and hence were more likely to have married and less likely to 
have divorced.  Education had little impact on men’s marriage or divorce risks (Kalmijn 2013). 
This pattern is consistent with the educational scenarios in the United States at the height of the 
1950’s male breadwinner model.  
In more egalitarian contexts, however, highly-educated women and men were more 
likely to have married and less likely to have divorced (Kalmijn 2013).
4
  Kalmijn (2013) also 
found that highly-educated individuals were more likely to be married to one another as gender 
                                                          
4
 These results are consistent with Cooke et al.’s (2013) comparative study of harmonized national panel 
data, which reported that the reduction in divorce risk predicted by a wife’s university degree was about 
as great in Finland, Norway, and Sweden as in the United States.  
-14- 
 
equality increased. He concluded the stronger effect of men’s education on marriage in 
egalitarian countries relates to its cultural rather than economic implications.  Educated women 
married educated men because the latter are more involved in childcare and hold more 
egalitarian attitudes about their wives’ employment (Kalmijn 2013).  
Missing from Kalmijn’s study due to data limitations are the many other characteristics 
associated with education that also affect marriage probabilities. Lower education predicts a 
range of problems, from disability and poor health (Eurofound 2016), to greater illicit drug use 
and binge drinking, particularly among young men (Duncan, Wilkinson, and England 2006). 
Men with less education are more likely to commit domestic violence as well (Aizner 2010; 
Costa, et al. 2016).   
These associations do not mean that forcing men to gain additional education will reduce 
the negative behaviors, as the causal arrow goes in the other direction.  Behavioral and socio-
emotional factors account for both education and employment outcomes, and behavioral 
problems are more prevalent among boys than girls (see Bertrand and Pan 2013).  Once young 
adults are engaged in illicit behaviors, they are the most difficult to reach with any education, 
training, or employment program (Eurofound 2016).  At the same time, Cherlin (2014) 
summarized U.S. qualitative research indicating that the persistent pressure on less-skilled men 
to fulfill the elusive patriarchal economic norm pushes them into illicit activities.  This suggests 
outdated patriarchal norms do not support positive employment behavior among men. 
Some academics and policy makers believe marriage “improves” men by encouraging 
them to give up bad habits and encourage their efforts to earn more money under the male 
breadwinner norm (Wilcox and Price, this volume). For example, many studies find that married 
men earn more than either their single or divorced counterparts (Ahituv and Lerman 2007), 
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although the magnitude of this marriage premium varies across countries (Schoeni 1995) and 
among men within countries (Cooke 2014).  But a growing body of research finds that it is more 
a case of “better” men selecting into marriage rather than a causal effect of marriage.  Duncan 
and his colleagues (2006) found that U.S. men’s legal and illegal substance abuse significantly 
decreased before entering cohabitation or marriage, not after.  In Norway, men who ultimately 
married had chosen higher-wage occupations years before they partnered (Petersen, Penner, and 
Høgnes 2014). Consequently, partnered men did not earn higher wages as compared with single 
men in the same occupations (Petersen, et al. 2014).  Similarly, U.S. men tend to marry during 
periods of high wage growth, which plateaus (Dougherty 2006; Killewald and Lundberg 2017) 
or even declines after the year of marriage (Loughran and Zissimopoulos 2009).  
All in all, more desirable men are selected into stable marriages, either because men who 
are particularly keen to have a family actively prepare for it earlier in the life course, or because 
savvy women actively pursue such men for marriage.  Women who remain in education have the 
greatest opportunity to meet a large number of potentially desirable partners over several years 
before deciding on one.  As societal gender equality increases and cultural norms about family 
evolve, less-educated women feel less compelled to legally commit to someone from their pool 
of likely partners.  Less-educated women do marry, of course.  But women most frequently cite 
drug or alcohol abuse, domestic violence, as well as poor employment prospects as reasons for 
divorce (Härkönen 2014).  The greater likelihood of these family-deleterious behaviors among 
less-educated men therefore contributes to educational gradients in marriage as well as divorce. 
Patriarchy versus gender equality 
The body of evidence outlined above suggests the patriarchal norm of fathers as economic heads 
of households is incongruous with the educational and employment trends that highlight growing 
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female advantage among low- to moderately-educated adults. Men’s paid work is still important 
for family formation and stability, but it is increasingly important for women as well. For 
example, studies cited in Cooke and Baxter (2010) found that the unemployment of either 
husbands or wives increased the risk of divorce in Finland and Norway.   What is at odds with 
labor market trends is the assumption of men’s wage advantage over women in general and their 
opposite-sex partner specifically.      
A further problem with the patriarchal norm is that it precludes equally-valued roles for 
men’s expressive as well as economic contribution to family.  Indeed, a new norm of family men 
as emotionally engaged and domestically involved has become pervasive since the 1970s, but it 
still sits subordinate to the patriarchal norm of breadwinning (Gerson 1993; Segal 2007).  As 
long as the patriarchal norm dominates, couples will find it culturally difficult to enact different 
divisions of household labor that might better suit their individual capabilities within post-
industrial markets.   Goldscheider and Sassler (this volume) discuss the compelling evidence that 
men in particular would enact more egalitarian domestic divisions if they believe that other men 
support these. This highlights that even the most entrenched norms of masculinity can shift with 
public support from other men. 
The economic and social trends together suggest that full institutional support for gender 
equality will ultimately support greater family stability in the post-industrial global economy.  
There is already some evidence that this is the case among younger cohorts. For example, U.S. 
marriages where the woman has more education than the man are no longer more likely to 
divorce as they were a generation or two ago (Schwartz and Han 2014).  At the same time, a U.S. 
wife’s employment still increases the risk of divorce (Cooke, et al. 2013; Killewald 2016).  This 
contrasts, however, with the effect of wives’ employment in countries with greater policy 
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support for equality. In Finland, Norway, and Sweden, wives’ employment in fact lowers the risk 
of divorce (Cooke, et al. 2013).  Even within the United States, Cooke (2006) found that first 
marriages were most stable when couples had more equal divisions of paid and unpaid work. The 
optimal mix during the 1990s was when the wife contributed 40% to family earnings and the 
man 40% to unpaid domestic tasks (Cooke 2006).    
But it would be naïve to expect a smooth or rapid normative transition from patriarchal 
dominance to egalitarianism, particularly when some view the changes as entailing loss of public 
and private power.  As noted by Carlson (this volume), cohabitation in lieu of marriage is 
widespread across the more egalitarian Nordic countries and cohabiting unions everywhere are 
less stable than married ones.  In addition, Carlson’s (Figure 3) data showed that the 2014 
divorce rate per 1000 people was higher in Denmark than in the notoriously divorce-prone 
United States. Even when limiting comparisons to the smaller proportion of Nordic couples who 
marry, Finnish and Swedish divorce rates are among the top of the list, although not as high as in 
the United States and Russia (Fahey 2014: Figure 2).   
In addition, other signs point to greater benefits of institutionalizing gender equality over 
patriarchy. Aizner (2010) found that U.S. domestic violence decreased when the gender wage 
gap decreased, whereas a traditional grab for patriarchal power would have predicted an 
increase. Esping-Andersen and Billari (2015) highlight the recovery in fertility rates in the 
Nordic countries as compared with persistent low fertility in more gender-traditional European 
contexts.  
Further aggregate evidence of a positive link between gender equality and partnered 
households is contained in Table 3. The first column displays the United Nations’ Gender 
Inequality Index rating for numerous countries in Europe and the Americas. The index rates 
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countries on women’s reproductive health, empowerment, and economic status,5 and ranges from 
zero, indicating perfect gender equality, to one, indicating extreme gender inequality.  The 
ratings confirm the high degree of gender equality in the Nordic countries, along with the 
Netherlands and Germany. Most of the rest of Europe along with Canada have moderately high 
gender equality, whereas it is noticeably lower in Hungary, the UK and United States.  It is 
lowest in familistic Latin America.   
The second column displays the percentage of children under the age of 17 who are 
living in a single-mother household.   The percentage is smallest in Greece at less than 4% and 
greatest in Colombia and the Dominican Republic where more than one quarter of children 
reside with a lone mother.  The UK and United States are more similar to Latin America, with 
more than one-fifth of young children residing in single-mother households.  Overall, the 
percentage of children residing in single mother households increases as gender inequality 
increases (correlation 0.64, p< .000).   
[Table 3 about here] 
Whether institutionalized gender equality or patriarchy supports greater family stability in 
post-industrial societies is much more than an academic debate. The core issue behind the debate 
is the relationship between family forms and the individual outcomes noted in the bottom box of 
Figure 1 (see also Reeves, this volume).  A sizeable literature documents that father absence 
predicts greater risks of behavioral, educational, and employment problems in the next 
generation.  My final argument, building on an insight from Moynihan, is that any pathology 
                                                          
5
 Reproductive health is measured by maternal mortality ratio and adolescent birth rates; empowerment 
includes the proportion of parliamentary seats occupied by women along with the proportion of adult men 
and women aged 25 and older with at least some secondary education; and economic status encompasses 
the labor force participation rate of female and male populations aged 15 years and older. See 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii for more detail.  
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associated with residing in single-mother households is an artifact of patriarchy that limits these 
households’ access to resources.   Proof of this conjecture is that the negative outcomes are 
minimized where cultural, market, and state institutions instead support greater gender equality.  
Institutional intersections and group differences in family outcomes 
Senator Moynihan’s 1965 report for the U.S. Department of Labor brought discussion of child 
outcomes associated with single-mother households into the public debate.  In that report, he 
noted the very high divorce and nonmarital birth rates among African American families as 
compared with whites, and the strong correlations between father absence and children’s low 
intelligence scores, school truancy, crime, drug addiction, etc. (Moynihan 1965). There were 
very strong educational gradients in effects that he attributed to the deep-seated U.S. racism 
undermining African American men’s access to education and employment and, in turn, their 
relative employment advantage over African American women.  Moynihan (1965:29) concluded 
the poor intergenerational outcomes were indicative of the “pathology of matriarchy” within a 
society that presumed and rewarded male leadership in public and private life. Moynihan did not 
consider patriarchy superior or inevitable, just normative at the time. One of his key insights was 
that it was the mismatch between individual and current normative circumstances that accounted 
for the ill effects, not a pathology inherent to matriarchy.  
In this chapter I detailed the similar dismantling of economic rewards since Moynihan 
wrote his report for a growing proportion of men based on education, along with the sizeable 
increase in women’s public participation and private power.  Yet the assumed pathology of 
matriarchy persists in much of the U.S. literature even as accumulating evidence indicates norms 
are giving way to more gender egalitarian family arrangements.  McLanahan (2004) gave it a 
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less provocative name of “diverging destinies,” with the likelihood of father absence predicated 
on mothers’ education rather than race-ethnicity.6  
To be sure, studies from a range of Western countries confirm that parental separation 
and subsequent family transitions predict some risk of negative effects on children’s 
psychological well-being, behavior, grades, test scores, educational attainment, own early onset 
of sexual activity, early childbearing, and risk of divorce in adulthood (Garriga and Berta, this 
volume; Härkönen, Bernardi, and Boertien 2017; McLanahan, et al. 2013; Perelli-Harris, this 
volume).  McLanahan (2004) contends the negative outcomes derive from the lesser resources of 
single-parent households, in terms of both money and parental attention.   As less-educated 
women are more likely to be single parents, their children face a larger resource deficit.   
Confirming the causal direction of effects, however, is tricky (Autor, et al. 2016; Perelli-
Harris, this volume). Lower socio-economic status already predicts worse outcomes for children 
whether in two- or single-parent households. Another possibility is that some other characteristic 
might account for both family instability and children’s outcomes (Autor, et al., 2016; Perelli-
Harris, this volume).  Analyses controlling for children’s stable unobserved characteristics, prior 
behavior, or school performance indeed find smaller effects than when comparing across 
children (Härkönen, et al. 2017; McLanahan, et al. 2013).  In other words, these children would 
have done worse regardless of family structure.      
Furthermore, like patriarchy, the negative effects associated with spending time in a 
single-mother household are not inevitable. Most studies report “average” effects.  In all 
countries, a sizeable minority if not majority of children experiencing family instability do just 
                                                          
6
 Others point out that the educational gradients mainly mask the institutionalized racial-ethnic 
disadvantage originally noted by Moynihan (Autor, et al. 2016; Esteve and Paredes, this volume; Garriga 
and Berta, this volume).   
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fine or perhaps better than had their fathers been present (Härkönen, et al. 2017).  Furthermore, 
more redistributive welfare states and greater policy support for maternal employment minimize 
the negative intergenerational effects because they increase available resources (Härkönen, et al. 
2017; Nieuwenhuis and Maldonado, forthcoming).  In Europe, this realization resulted in the 
adoption of a policy discourse around social investment rather than social protection (Jenson 
2009).  Whereas traditional welfare policies aimed to reduce current family poverty, social 
investment policies aim to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty (Jenson 2009). The goal 
is to ensure current and future employment growth within a (skilled) knowledge economy 
(Bonoli 2005).  Patterned on the Nordic model, social investment policies stress greater 
education and skills for the next generation, simultaneous with current high levels of female 
labor force participation facilitated by more policy supports for employed parents and carers 
(Bonoli 2005; Jenson 2009).   
The impact of public investment on families’ economic resources is evident in the final 
three columns of Table 3.  The third column indicates the percentage of gross domestic product 
(GDP) spent on family transfers in each of the countries (information not available for Latin 
America). Note the particularly low level of U.S. public investment (0.7% of GDP in 2010) as 
compared with Europe and Canada.  With this low level of public investment comes a high level 
of poverty even among U.S. two-parent households—commensurate with the far less affluent 
Mediterranean countries struggling under austerity measures.  The poverty rate for U.S. single-
mother households was a staggering 45.9% in 2010, exceeding that of any country in the table 
except Peru.  In contrast, poverty rates of single-mother households in the redistributive Nordic 
countries were on average similar to the U.S. poverty rate for two-parent households. 
-22- 
 
These aggregate differences manifest at the individual level.  McLanahan and colleagues’ 
(2013) review consistently found significant negative effects of father absence on U.S. children’s 
educational and mental health outcomes, but effects were often weaker or entirely absent in other 
countries.  For example, the educational penalty for father absence is twice as large in the United 
States as in Germany or the UK (Bernardi and Boertien 2017).  What research is just beginning 
to untangle is how child outcomes differ systematically at the intersection of gender and class 
(and race-ethnicity).      
Gender-class gaps in effects 
Ascertaining possible gender or class differences in the impact of family structure on child 
outcomes is difficult because both characteristics predict behavioral and educational differences 
irrespective of family structure. As already mentioned, children benefit from economic and 
parental resources, the level of which increases as parents’ education increases. Consequently 
children of less-educated parents on average have more behavioral problems and complete less 
education than children of highly-educated parents.  Whether father absence magnifies this class 
disadvantage is unclear.  
Two recent literature reviews found that approximately half of the reviewed studies 
concluded that children of less-educated single parents fare worse, whereas the other half 
concluded that the absence of a highly-educated father is more detrimental (Härkönen, et al. 
2017; McLanahan, et al. 2013). Bernardi and Boertien (2017) contend the varying conclusions 
stem from the different methods used in the analyses. Once controlling for this, they found that 
father absence had the least impact on the educational attainment of children of less-educated 
mothers in Germany, Italy, the UK, and United States (Bernardi and Boertien 2017).  Whether 
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future research with similar attention to methodological issues will reinforce this conclusion is an 
empirical question. 
 Gender differences in the impact of residing with a single mother are apparent, however, 
at least in the United States. These develop from biological differences wherein boys do worse 
than girls on a range of non-cognitive measures affecting school success (Bertrand and Pan 
2013).  U.S. boys are more likely than girls to be diagnosed with attention deficit disorder and 
have lower levels of inhibitory control and perceptual sensitivity, which equates to greater 
aggression (see Bertrand and Pan 2013). U.S. girls also have a slight but reliable advantage in 
delaying gratification (Silverman 2003, cited in Bertrand and Pan 2013). Bertrand and Pan 
(2013) contend that some of the growing gender differences in educational attainment discussed 
earlier can be traced to these non-cognitive gender differences in children. 
The source of the gender behavioral differences may be biological, but as with all 
essentialist differences, behaviors are responsive to environmental factors.  U.S. evidence 
indicates that boys’ outcomes deteriorate further with the reduction in parenting resources of 
single-mother households (Bertrand and Pan 2013; Cooper, et al. 2011).  Not only is there just 
one parent, but single U.S. mothers engage less with boys than girls from a very young age, 
although parental time investment increases with mothers’ education (Bertrand and Paul 2013).  
Consequently, U.S. girls generally fare better than boys in single-parent households.  Girls’ 
greater resilience in the face of family change contributes to their educational success and 
adaptability to changing labor markets that demand high skills (Bertrand and Pan 2013).    
Looking at effects at the intersection of gender and class using detailed Florida student 
records, Autor and colleagues (2016) found that the gender gaps in academic and behavioral 
outcomes in both single- and two-parent families shrink as parental socio-economic status 
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increases.  Overall, boys’ outcomes are more strongly contingent on family structure as well as 
economic resources, although high-quality schools can somewhat narrow the gender gap (Autor, 
et al. 2016).  The smaller impact of schools as well as neighborhoods on U.S. boys’ behavioral 
and academic outcomes indicates that Reeves’ (this volume) suggestion of sending 
disadvantaged children to boarding schools would not rectify the inequalities. Doing so may 
particularly harm boys because it would remove both parents from their daily lives.   
These gender differences in child outcomes may be another case of U.S. exceptionalism, 
driven by the high levels of class and gender inequality in that country. Comparative research is 
needed to ascertain whether the more egalitarian policy contexts specifically minimize the 
negative impact of single motherhood on boys.  It does seem likely that the perpetuation of the 
patriarchal norm in unequal contexts such as the United States contributes to the 
intergenerational gender differences.  The expectation that men should be the primary family 
breadwinner in markets with a high degree of income inequality sharply reduces women’s 
perceived benefit of committing to less-educated men. Men’s failure to achieve the patriarchal 
ideal coupled with their biological predisposition to act out increases the risk they will engage in 
further negative behaviors that limit their time with residential or non-residential children.  The 
next generation of boys suffers the most from father absence in contexts of high inequality, 
perpetuating the cycle of maladaptation as institutional support for patriarchal entitlement in the 
family, market, and state continues to ebb.  However, the solution is not to return to the 
patriarchal system built on gender inequality. Instead, what is needed is to fully institutionalize 




Family futures: Making gender equality a “complete” institution 
In this chapter I highlighted how group inequalities configured at the intersections of family, 
market, and state institutions vary across place and evolve over time. My argument is that the 
institutional arrangements supporting patriarchy in the post-war decades have been crumbling for 
quite some time. A high-skill, technologically-driven global economy requires brains rather than 
brawn, and adaptable, socially-engaged service providers. In Western societies, many of the 
requisite traits are traditionally feminine.  Indeed, in the past half-century we have seen a 
remarkable ascendancy of women in the economic, social, and political order.   
As the new institutional order unfolds, the value of education continues to increase 
(Autor 2010; Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997; Machin 2010).  Education not only imparts skills, 
but encourages more egalitarian attitudes and predicts more positive social behaviors as well.  
Yet men’s educational attainment has not kept pace with women’s over the past few decades.  
Consequently a sizable proportion of men struggle to adapt to the new socio-economic demands 
in and outside of the home.  
The gender revolution is far from complete, but many women perceive themselves as 
sufficiently independent to go it alone at some stage of raising their children when their partners 
fall short of economic or behavioral expectations.  Although much more comparative research is 
needed, available evidence finds that boys’ essentialist behavioral problems magnify when 
fathers are absent from the household. These behavioral problems eclipse boys’ educational 
development, which blunts the possibility that a larger proportion of the next generation can 
enjoy the greater family stability associated with greater educational attainment.  
This vicious circle of intergenerational inequality down the male line does not indicate a 
pathology of matriarchy as initially suggested by Moynihan in the mid-1960s. It instead point to 
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the growing pathology of patriarchy in post-industrial economies, because better institutional 
supports for gender along with class equality yield the best intergenerational outcomes.  The 
reason we have not yet eradicated the risks is because gender equality remains an “incomplete 
institution” even in the most progressive contexts.  I borrow this term from Cherlin’s (1978) 
seminal article on remarriage after divorce. In that article, Cherlin argued that remarriages were 
less stable than first marriages because they lacked the institutional support in language, law, and 
custom that benefited first marriages.  Similarly, I hold that the detrimental behaviors among 
boys and men will be staunched only once gender equality has become fully institutionalized in 
the family, market, and state. Institutionalizing gender equality eases the pressure on men to 
dominate paid work, allowing more adaptive masculinities to develop in which men’s equal 
contributions to both paid and unpaid work support family stability. I conclude with some brief 
thoughts on the major market and policy challenges to achieving this.  
The first challenge is to enhance children’s and particularly boys’ educational 
engagement from pre-school that will carry them through to complete higher levels of education. 
This perspective is core to the EU’s social investment strategy.  But as someone who worked on 
educational reform in her pre-academic career, I can attest that the challenge is not the what, but 
the how. Most compulsory educational systems developed with the assumption of an at-home 
mother (Cooke 2011), and that children would adapt to the school structures and processes. Both 
of these assumptions undermine academic achievement.  
Instead, educational processes need to adapt to children’s and families’ needs.  This 
includes additional public funding for more aides of both genders in the classroom, innovative 
approaches to curriculum delivery, high-quality care and learning opportunities before and after 
standard school days, further supports for children with any type of special need (including 
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behavioral), and coordinated extra-curricular activities that do not require parents to shuttle 
children to and from venues.  These supports should extend through adolescence, during which 
young persons are at greatest risk of becoming NEET—not in education, employment, or 
training (Eurofound 2016).  
The second challenge is that both parents need more workplace flexibility to ensure they 
can be actively involved in their children’s daily lives. At present, organizations still reinforce 
patriarchal expectations of an ideal worker without competing family demands (Acker 2006). 
These expectations manifest in disparate gendered penalties when employees seek workplace 
flexibility. For example, one U.S. study found that male employees who experienced a family 
conflict received lower performance ratings and lower reward recommendations, whereas ratings 
of women were unaffected by family conflicts (Butler and Skattebo 2004).   
There is also a strong class dimension to organizational gendered expectations. Glass 
(2004) found that mothers in professional or managerial occupations incurred slightly larger 
wage penalties when they worked reduced hours or worked from home, as compared with 
mothers in other occupations who took up similar workplace options. Similarly, Brescoll and 
colleagues (2013) found that employers were more likely to grant low- than high-status men’s 
requests for flexible work schedules for family reasons.  High-status men were more likely to be 
granted leave for career development (Brescoll, et al. 2013).   
This nascent literature supports Goldscheider and Sassler’s optimism that the second half 
of the gender revolution is now unfolding among less-educated couples, which should ultimately 
reduce educational gradients in marriage and divorce.  At the same time, workplaces are 
stymying further gender equality progress among the more highly-educated, beyond providing 
market alternatives for domestic production that widen class gaps among women (Gupta, et al. 
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2010).  Persistent patriarchal advantage at the top of the class hierarchy blocks the thorough 
institutionalization of gender equality. One way to quell this is with more aggressive 
redistributive tax policies, the proceeds of which could be fed into the educational system.  
Also needed are more aggressive positive discrimination policies, but targeted at the top 
of the occupational structure. Affirmative action entered U.S. equality legislation with Johnson’s 
1965 Executive Order 11246, although it has subsequently come under fire as discriminating 
against unprotected groups. Positive discrimination is also allowed under the European 
Commission’s 2006/54/EC directive on the implementation of the principle of equal 
opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation.  
Again, however, many countries have argued against positive discrimination because in principle 
it violates men’s rights to equality (Cooke 2011).   
Gender equality at the executive level remains most elusive.  The European Union is 
ahead of the Americas in tackling this with specific targets of increasing the percentage of 
women in key decision-making positions (European Commission 2016). In 2003, Norway 
mandated that 40% of non-executive board positions be filled by women.  Although that 
controversial law is now considered a success, its implementation has not tricked down to 
increase the percentage of women in executive positions (Bertrand, et al. 2015). Women’s ability 
to succeed when appointed to executive positions is contingent on eliminating the patriarchal 
organizational norms for executives as noted above. 
The resistance to positive discrimination highlights the cultural resistance to fully 
disavowing patriarchy, a cultural resistance that has proven slow to change. Goldscheider and 
Sassler (this volume) discuss the gender essentialism behind such resistance, so I will not repeat 
the arguments here.  But as they also argue and as indicated throughout this chapter, both 
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markets and policies can prod us further along the path to gender equality and, in turn, better 
family outcomes. Only when gender equality is fully institutionalized in markets and policies can 
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Figure 1 Nested intersections of institutions, family processes, and outcomes  
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Table 1 Labor market polarization across Europe  
 SHARE OF HOURS WORKED 










Continental northern Europe:    
   Austria -0.59 -14.58 15.17 
   Belgium 1.48 -9.50 8.03 
   France -0.74 -12.07 12.81 
   Germany 3.05 -8.71 5.67 
   Netherlands 2.27 -4.68 2.41 
Continental southern Europe:    
   Greece 1.75 -6.08 4.34 
   Italy -8.20 -9.08 17.28 
   Portugal 2.39 -1.13 -1.26 
   Spain 0.96 -7.04 6.07 
Nordic     
   Denmark -0.96 -7.16 8.13 
   Finland 6.66 -6.54 -0.12 
   Norway 4.96 -6.52 1.57 
   Sweden 1.90 -6.93 5.03 
English-speaking (liberal)    
   Ireland 6.19 -5.47 -0.72 
   UK 5.77 -10.32 4.55 
EU Average 1.58 -7.77 6.19 
 




Table 2           Female labor force participation rates over time (age 25 to 54) 
 








Mexico - - - 45.4 54.1 55.2 27.5 18% 
Costa Rica - - 38.7 47.7 61.0 64.2 29.8 - 
         
Canada  60.0 75.5 78.5 82.3 82.0 26.4 19 
UK - - 73.0 76.2 78.6 80.0 37.7 17 
USA 55.1 64.0 74.0 76.7 75.2 73.7 17.4 17 
         
Belgium - - 60.8 72.7 80.4 80.2 30.2 6 
France - - 72.2 78.6 83.4 83.0 22.3 14 
Germany 52.8 56.6 63.4 76.9 81.3 82.5 37.4 17 
Netherlands 28.5 36.7 58.5 72.7 82.3 82.1 60.7 19 
         
Italy 31.3 39.9 53.9 57.9 64.5 65.9 32.8 6 
Greece - - 51.5 62.0 72.4 77.7 16.3 9 
Portugal 46.2 54.4 68.0 77.3 84.9 86.0 12.6 19 
Spain 27.9 30.4 46.9 62.8 78.8 82.0 23.1 9 
         
Czech 
Republic - - - 81.8 79.8 81.4 7.4 16 
Estonia - - 88.3 84.1 84.8 82.8 12.2 27 
         
Denmark - - 87.8 84.0 85.3 83.4 25.8 7 
Finland 78.5 82.7 86.4 85.0 84.4 83.5 16.4 20 
Norway 55.3 68.9 79.2 83.5 84.4 83.9 27.6 6 
Sweden 74.3 82.9 90.7 85.6 86.6 88.3 18.0 13 
 
Source:  From OECD statistics, http://stats.oecd.org/, accessed 26 March 2017.  The gender wage gap is 
from OECD (2016: 239) and is unadjusted, calculated as the difference between the unadjusted median 
earnings of men and the median earnings of women, relative to the median earnings of men. Part-time 




Table 3 Gender inequality, social expenditures, and percent of children under 17 living in 
poverty in two- versus single-parent families, circa 2010 


















Denmark 0.06 16.9 3.8 3.1 10.8 
Finland 0.08 10.4 3.1 2.5 11.7 
Norway 0.08 13.1 3.1 3.1 16.7 
Sweden 0.05 18.0 3.4 3.3 10.4 
      
Belgium 0.11 10.3 2.8 4.9  28.1  
France 0.11 13.8 2.9 8.2 29.4 
Germany 0.09 15.6 2.2 4.1 36.2 
Greece 0.16  3.7 1.4 16.6 39.4 
Italy 0.12  8.5 1.3 17.6 33.0 
Netherlands 0.05 11.5 1.5 2.9 32.5 
Spain 0.12  7.7 1.5 19.5 32.7 
      
Czech Republic 0.14 12.2 2.4 7.4 32.2 
Estonia 0.19 15.7 2.6 9.4 30.2 
Hungary 0.24 14.6 3.4 11.5 18.6 
      
UK 0.21 21.0 4.0 7.6 14.3 
Canada 0.14 13.4 1.3 10.6 37.4 
US 0.30 21.0 0.7 13.7 45.9 
      
Brazil 0.45 19.2 * 27.8 40.5 
Colombia 0.48 25.1 * 21.8 32.5 
Dominican Republic 0.48 26.4 * 21.8 31.8 
Guatemala 0.54 18.3 * 29.4 26.2 
Mexico 0.45 16.0 1.1 25.3 22.3 
Panama 0.49 22.6 * 29.7 38.9 
Paraguay 0.48 17.6 * 27.6 33.8 
Peru 0.42 16.2 * 30.7 52.0 
Source: Gender Inequality Index (0 no inequality to 1 total inequality) from the 2010-2015 average from 
UN Human Development Report 2011: 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/271/hdr_2011_en_complete.pdf;  Social expenditure data for 
-39- 
 
2010 from OECD, http://www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure, retrieved 24 March 2017.  Child poverty 
rates are the percent of children under 17 living in households with less than 50% median household 
income, from LIS Key Figures for 2010 or the next earlier wave, http://www.lisdatacenter.org/lis-ikf-
webapp/app/search-ikf-figures, accessed 24 March 2017. Asterisk (*) indicates information not available.  
 
 
 
